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Abstract Devolution of natural resource management is a widely claimed aim in policy
discourse. The Government of Pakistan is undertaking devolution of Provincial Govern-
ment, including the Provincial Forest Departments. In historical and current practice, forest
management has been devolved to local, community-based jirgas. Jirgas achieve some of
the aims claimed by devolution which often fail in community-based management
organizations. They represent the interests of different asset-based groups and ensure use
rights of all for subsistence. However, the internal logic on which they work is based on
different principles than those envisaged by policymakers. A case study of Pukhtun
agropastoralists in the Malakand Division, North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan,
illustrates the jirga’s role in forest management and questions some of the assumptions
on which community-based management is founded.
Key words Forest . community-based management . jirgas . devolution . Pakistan .
Pukhtun (pashtun, pathan)R
Introduction
Devolution of natural resource management is a widely claimed aim in policy discourse.1
The Government of Pakistan is currently undertaking devolution of Provincial Government,
including the Provincial Forest Departments. Both initiatives have been encouraged and
supported by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and bilateral donors (ADB,
2003; ICG, 2004). In historical and current practice, forest management has been devolved
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to local, community-based jirgas. Jirgas achieve some of the aims claimed by devolution.
They represent the interests of different asset-based groups and ensure use rights of all for
subsistence. However, the internal logic on which they work is based on different principles
than those envisaged by policymakers.
A jirga is an egalitarian body composed of all men concerned with a specific issue, plus
other individuals who are respected for their skills in negotiation and reconciliation. Women
do not participate in jirgas, although they may be influential behind the public arena. In
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan,
such as the Malakand Division, jirga decisions are legally binding provided that there is
consensus among all the parties involved. Representation is based on alliances, not by
elected representatives of interest groups based on economic assets. Factions within the
jirga are usually based on lineage, on patronage, and/or on cultural value orientations; and
hence these alliances are fluid, depending on the issue.
The aims of this paper are twofold. The first is to question some of the assumptions on
which community-based management (CBM)2 is founded. Malakand Division of the North-
West Frontier Province of Pakistan provides an interesting case for a number of reasons.
First, although the state owns most of the forests and has laws to regulate forest use, the
forests are under the de facto control of local communities. Second, jirgas are the first and
major level of management and dispute settlement in Provincially Administered Tribal
Areas (PATA). Third, the new Forest Ordinance, 2002, which was extended to include the
Malakand Division in late 2004, specifies that local communities will be involved in forest
management, under the supervision of the Forest Department (Government of NWFP,
2002). And fourth, there is heterogeneity of forest management practices, reflecting the
ecological diversity and isolation that has stimulated the historical evolution of different
patterns. There are areas where powerful khans manage forests in an autocratic and feudal
manner; in other areas, forests are managed as communal property with stringent
restrictions for those who are not ‘community’ members. In this paper I discuss just one
of these patterns. Thus my second aim is to describe forest management practices in a
specific ecological, historical, and community context.
It is ironic that devolution should be introduced as new. By the local account, de facto
forest management has been devolved since the ancestors of the present Pukhtun population
conquered the area of the present Malakand Division in the sixteenth century.3 Attempts at
central control have predominantly focused on state control of timber logging and land
registration. In practice, the state has had limited control, especially in remote areas. The
inaccessibility of the research area has protected the forests from the intensive levels of
state-controlled and illegal forest extraction seen in many other parts of Malakand Division.
The discourse of devolution is often associated with a number of related concepts, for
example, decentralization, democracy, good governance, participation, and sustainable
resource use. For example, after seizing power in 1999, President Musharraf claimed that
“The strategic aim of the Government is to establish genuine democracy as soon as possible
and transfer power to the people” (Government of Pakistan, National Reconstruction
Bureau, 2002). To this end, the National Reconstruction Bureau was established to
“Generate fundamental thought on promoting good governance to strengthen democracy
through the reconstruction of institutions of State related to all aspects of governance and
social welfare” (Government of Pakistan, National Reconstruction Bureau, 2002).
2 Throughout this paper, I use the term community-based management as a general term for various forms of
participatory, local-level management organizations.
3 Their legend corresponds to that cited by Caroe (1957, 1990). See also Ahmed, 1976.
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The purpose of devolution is to make government more accountable and to ensure more
equal representation through decentralization. The North-West Frontier Province Local
Government Ordinance, 2001, defines decentralize or decentralized as “...conferment by the
Government [of NWFP] under this Ordinance of its administrative and financial authority
for the operation, functioning and management of specified offices of the Provincial
Government to the local governments” (Government of NWFP, 2001, p. 2). “The new
system...reorients [the] administrative system to allow public participation in decision-
making. The essence of this system is that the local governments are accountable to citizens
for all their decisions. It enables the proactive elements of society to participate in
community work and development related activities” (Government of Pakistan, National
Reconstruction Bureau, 2002).
Of particular interest is that local tiers of elected bodies will have more power to control
local services and to identify local needs for development and that seats on these bodies
will be reserved for those who rarely get elected. For example, at the Union Council level
(constituting one or more census villages), 21 members are: a) 12 Muslim members, elected
to general seats, including four reserved for women; b) six members, elected to seats
reserved for peasants and workers,4 including two reserved for women; c) one member
elected to a seat reserved for minority communities; and d) Union Nazim and Naib Union
Nazim elected as joint candidates. Elections were held in 2001; however, the effectiveness
of the devolution process in Pakistan has been criticized severely (cf. ICG, 2004).
A similar discourse was used in a policy document of the North-West Frontier Province
Forest Department:
Effective participation of the local communities in the sustainable management and
development of forests requires the devolution of the requisite authority and
responsibilities to them. Also, a more rational distribution of authority and responsi-
bilities is needed within the forest administration. Such devolution requires the forest
administration to concentrate on setting the criteria for sustainable forest management
and monitoring their achievement leaving the bulk of implementation to the local
stakeholders, especially where the forests are owned by the people or where they are the
dominant right holders...
The policy would foster inter and intra-generational equity. Among others, it
includes inter-gender equity, equity between the powers and tasks of Forest
Departmental Personnel and the local communities, and between different groups in
local communities. (Government of NWFP, 1999, p.7)
The actual North-West Frontier Province Forest Ordinance, 2002, also uses the discourse
of devolution. Local committees are to be involved in making a local forest management
plan, and community-based organizations may be involved in management.
The Divisional Forest Officer may assign to any village forest community, village
organization, Joint Forest Management Committee constituted in the prescribed manner
all or any of its rights of management over any protected forest, guzara forests, and
protected wasteland, and may cancel such assignment, or such agreement, as the case
may be, if he is of the opinion that such revocation is in the interest of forest
conservancy. All forests so assigned shall be called community forest. (Government of
NWFP, 2002, p. 1197)
4 No definition of peasant or worker is given.
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The Forest Ordinance is not clear about the structure of community-based management
organizations. Unlike the spirit of the 1999 document and other Forest Department policy
documents (Javed et al., 2002; Tawawalla, 2004), the actual Forest Ordinance emphasizes
that the Forest Department shall remain in control of forest use and conservation and that its
powers to enforce its rules shall be strengthened. Strict sanctions including heavy fines and
imprisonment for rule breaking are detailed. And Forest Guards will be armed (Government
of NWFP, 2002).5
Nowhere in these two Ordinances is democracy, good governance, participation or
sustainable resource use defined explicitly. Rather, these concepts are used ambiguously
and are interlinked by association which is reinforced by rhetoric. “Most ‘devolved’ natural
resources management (NRM) reflects rhetoric more than substance, and is characterized
by some continuation of substantive central government control and management over
natural resources rather than a genuine shift in authority to local people” (Shackleton et al.,
2002, p.1). There is a wide literature on these concepts which will not be reviewed here.6
The central question is to what extent and under what conditions decentralization and
devolution of rights to forests and management can advance more equitable and sustainable
forest management. Distinctions need to be made between de jure rights articulated by
government law and de facto rights and use rights practiced by local inhabitants. De jure
forestland rights entail the rights of the state to protect the forests from deforestation, as
well as the right to gain income from the forest. Simultaneously, state land registration has
legitimized the traditional land rights of de facto private ownership for cultivated land,
alpine pastures and forests; 60% of the revenue from state-controlled logging is granted to
these royalty rightholders. However, in policy documents (both the previous Forest
Department Working Plans and in the new Forest Ordinance), all local inhabitants have
usufruct rights to fuelwood and building timbers. This ambiguity led to dichotomization of
the rights of forest user groups and created new arenas for disputes over forests. At the
same time, it reinforced patron–client relationships through which usufruct rights could be
maintained.
This leads to the question of what is the most equitable institution for protecting the use
rights of the entire population. More fundamentally, do the new institutional changes fit into
existing conceptual frameworks and practices, particularly with regard to local level
institutions? In the cultural context of the Pukhtun, it could be argued that institutions need
to protect the structure of patron–client relations in which moral obligations to those
without property rights are encouraged.
The idea of sustainable forest management—understood as deliberate efforts to maintain
the forests’ ecological values, production services and their role as a source of livelihood
for the rural poor—highlights contradictions between conservation and the livelihood needs
of local residents and the income needs of the state. Both of these latter demand greater
extraction of forest timber for income generation and this is antithetical to conservation.
One assumption of devolution is that formal changes in the institutional framework will
enable weaker groups to have more power (e.g., reserved seats on elected bodies), and thus
protect their economic and gendered interests. This leads to a second assumption that
political factions will be based on economic interest. This ignores the indigenous logic of
relations that are not based on economic interests alone, but rather are embedded in political
5 For a critical appraisal of implementation of the Forest Ordinance see Tawawalla, 2004. See Geiser, 2000;
Sarhad Awami Forestry Ittehad, 2000; and Suleri, 2002 for criticisms of earlier forest reform proposals.
6 Cf. for example, Campbell and Vainio-Mattila, 2003; Gauld, 2002; Geiser, 2003; Sundar and Jeffrey, 1999.
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and social relations based on kinship, patron–client relations, and cultural value orientations.
In addition, it assumes cooperation among members of a group and ignores historical,
geographical, and ecological contexts which help to account for the heterogeneity in patterns
of natural resource management.
Underlying the proposal for devolution is the idealization of CBM. Protagonists for
CBM have been criticized extensively on two counts: a) communities do not represent
homogeneous interests, and hence local élites have tended to dominate, and, b) these local-
level organizations do not protect the equitable distribution of resources (e.g., Agrawal and
Gibson, 2001; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila, 2003; Platteau and Abraham, 2002;
Sivaramakrishnan, 2000, 2001; Steimann, 2003; Sundar and Jeffrey, 1999; Sundar, 2000).
In response, stakeholder analysis, supported by the work on entitlements (Leach et al.,
1999) has attempted to address these criticisms. The poor success of bilateral donor-
supported CBM projects in the Malakand and Hazara Divisions of NWFP using different
participatory approaches7 is a consequence of assumptions which have been undergirded by
‘participatory’ methodological approaches.
...the incorporation of analysis of power, meaning and social complexity is especially
crucial to implementing policy, and specifically to evolving effective local strategies
for institution development. The methodological challenge which the need for such
decentralized and reflexive social analysis presents to development planning has
barely been addressed. For one thing, participatory research methods (e.g.,
Participatory Rural appraisal—PRA), which have gained wide currency recently are
weakest when it comes to the analysis of social relationships, those relations which set
the social conditions for participation itself (Mosse, 1999, p. 333).
My own study, with its more intensive focus on just one community, has, like Mosse’s
own study, sought to throw light on “those relations which set the social conditions for
participation itself.” There is a need for in-depth case studies to reconsider some of the
assumptions of CBM. This necessitates analysis at village level within a specific context. I
will begin with a stakeholder analysis and show how greater insight can be gained by
analysis of actual, individual practice.
I looked at how jirgas operated in 1994, even though alternative forms of CBM are now
being proposed, firstly because the Forest Ordinance was only recently promulgated in
Malakand Division and will take some time to be implemented. Secondly, there have been
few changes in the research area since 1994 with regard to forest management. Furthermore,
the Forest Ordinance grants the same rights to forest use and income for royalty rightholders
as existed before. Third, the process of reform in the Forest Department, initiated in 2002 in
non-tribal areas of NWFP, was evaluated as poor inMay, 2004, and some international donors
have withdrawn their funding (Tawawalla, 2004). Fourth, various forms of CBM schemes
have been initiated over the past 15–20 years in other parts of Malakand Division but no
forest projects have been initiated in the area of study. Fifth, the poor record of success with
these projects suggests that the logic on which CBM is based is flawed.
In the second section, the research methodology will be explained, followed by a
description of the research location. The third section will present a case study of how
forests are managed in a specific context, Ajmir Village, and will illustrate the inadequacy
of stakeholder analysis. The conclusions, section four, will address the opportunities,
7 For comparative overviews of CBM projects in other parts of the regions cf: Geiser, 2000, 2003, 2005;
Hasan, 2001; Knudsen, 1999; Steimann, 2003; and Suleri, 2002.
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barriers, and conditions that are necessary for decentralization and devolution of forest land
rights to enhance participatory and sustainable forest management.
Ajmir
Methodology
During the summers of 1993 and 1994,8 I lived with a family in Ajmir Village (Fig. 1). The
administrative (census) village of Ajmir comprises two villages: Ajmir and Logai, with a
total population of 2,652 (Government of NWFP, 1993). As a consequence of land sales
and dispute settlements, the land distribution and management of forests in the two parts are
different.9 This paper concentrates on Ajmir village. There are 211 households; most are
extended households, including adult sons and their families. Akhund Khel10 is the
dominant khel (descent group) in terms of numbers, landownership, and power.
The Pukhtun are exceptionally hospitable and honest informants; however, many are
suspicious of outsiders (particularly non-Muslims) and do not understand the concept of
research. Therefore, a great deal of my research is based on observation and informal
interviews which were recorded later in field notes, as well as in-depth interviews with key
informants. A census of all 211 households in Ajmir provided information about household
members, genealogy, and sources of livelihood: landholding, banda (alpine pastures and
forest) shares, transhumance patterns, migration patterns, and remittances. For those
households that I could not interview census data were obtained through key informants.
In addition, a survey of 108 households was made which was fairly representative of a
cross-section of the community in terms of khel, sub-khel, economic resources, and place of
residence. The interviews focused on details of livelihood, rights to the bandas, and
disputes. Interviews were also conducted in Logai Village and with residents in all 32
bandas of the administrative village of Ajmir.
Life histories were also collected to document changing livelihood patterns even though
none of my informants knew their correct age, nor did many have any idea of events
outside their area that I could use to locate an event historically. One of my female
students11 conducted research on the activities of women during part of the fieldwork in
1994. Living with a family made me a participant observer of everything from women’s
chores to the strategic planning of jirga meetings, which often included men and women.
The Malakand Division was chosen because I had contacts working there; however, I
did not want to work in an area where bilateral development projects were taking place
because I did not want to bias the research with expectations that it would bring
development funds. The only district in which on-going development projects were not
taking place was Shangla District. In fact, little research had or has been done there, partly
because it is relatively remote.
8 Exploratory research was done throughout Malakand Division for 4 months during 1991.
9 Mishra et al., 2003, reports variations within the same area of Himachal Pradesh.
10 The Akhund Khel consider themselves to be miangan, i.e., descendants of a religious Pir (in this case an
Akhund). However, unlike many other miangans, they claim that their land is mali kahanimat, i.e., land
cleared of non-believers, and inherited not Tserai, i.e., it was not given by a khan but conquered at a later
date than the conquest of the Swat valley in the 16th century. Therefore, their position should not be
confused with that described in some of the literature on Swat (e.g., Barth, 1959, and Ahmed, 1976).
11 Katinka Korver, M.Sc. student, Wageningen University.
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My formal introduction was through the NWFP Agriculture Department; hence my
safety was the responsibility of the District Agricultural Officer who insisted that I must
live in the household of one of the Agricultural Field Assistants. The Agricultural Officer
was a Miangan and, therefore, he wanted me to stay with a Miangan Field Assistant in
whom he had confidence. Therefore, the selection of a research location based on strictly
research criteria was not an option.
Location
Ajmir lies at the top of the Kana River valley that runs parallel to the Swat River and the
Indus. Poor roads and state services are a symptomatic consequence of political disunity,
comparative poverty, and relative isolation of Ajmir. As a consequence, it has remained a
relatively heavily forested area. At the time of research, the area was on the northeastern
fringe of Swat District, on the border of Kohistan. Subsequently, Swat District was divided
into three districts: Swat, Bunir, and Shangla.
The founder’s only son distributed all the land of the administrative village among his 11
sons, each receiving land for cultivation, fodder, and bandas.12 The 32 bandas in Ajmir
were included in this distribution. According to the Village Officer’s records, the total forest
area is 2,169 and 3,070 ha of mountain grass, i.e., 5,239 ha are banda of the total of
5,668 ha of land in the administrative village. Only 265 ha are cultivated. It takes about
Fig. 1 Location of Ajmir.
12 This division was never changed. In Swat, land was redistributed about every 20 years according to the
size of lineage and following. This was never done in Ajmir.
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three hours to walk to the uppermost bandas near the Akhund Khel hamlet and about
six hours to the farthest bandas in the administrative village.
The montane production strategy13 in Ajmir is characterized by transhumance to higher
pastures (2,500–4,000 m) during the warmer months and the careful balance between crop
and fodder production near the permanent settlement (2,000 m). This agro-pastoral system
is changing due to population pressure and the natural limits on increasing animal carrying
capacity and/or agricultural production. Two common responses are labor migration and
decreasing numbers of animals. Among Akhund Khel, the option of intensifying ag-
ricultural production is pursued by few because of limited labor and financial resources.
Furthermore, there are no households self-sufficient in grains or having more than a few
mature buffaloes, so all are dependent on supplementary sources of income almost ex-
clusively based on migration within Pakistan14 and sale of forest products.
Forest Management
Forests are the only source of fuel and timber for building. For all residents of Ajmir, the
forests have been commercialized through the sale of timber, fuel wood, roots, bark and
leaves. Furthermore, they are the most important source of wild foods, such as green leaves
which are a major source of vegetables in the diet.
In 1969, the Malakand Division was incorporated into Pakistan as a PATA. In 1972, all
the forests situated in Swat were declared the property of the provincial government. The
forests were declared Protected Forests in 1974 when the Forest Act of 1927 was extended
to Swat. Under the terms of the 1927 Act, the forestland rights of local inhabitants had to be
registered, primarily to sanction state-controlled commercial felling. Although the state
claims ownership, the rights of landholders are acknowledged. In Protected Forests, owners
(termed royalty right holders15 by the state) are entitled to 60% of the revenue (Javed et al.,
2002, pp. 6–7), although this royalty distribution can be rescinded at any time. Prior to
registration, commercial felling was on a small scale but from the late 1980s until the state
moratorium in 1993,16 state controlled commercial felling dramatically changed the value
of forests and the income of those with royalty rights. The registration of land entailed
registering the forests as separate from other land, including alpine pastures,17 even though
forests and alpine pastures (bandas) are conceptualized as one spatial entity. Forestland
registration did not improve the clarification of rights for different stakeholders. However, it
did improve the standard of living of those with rights to royalties from commercial felling.
Simultaneously, it weakened the livelihood security of those without royalty rights.
13 See Orlove and Guillet, 1985.
14 At the time of research, five men had migrated to the Middle East. In 2004, about 25 men had migrated
there (personal communication).
16 In response to flooding in other parts of the country and to prevent forest commissioners from harvesting
timber in excess of sustainable yields (ADB, 1995, p. 12). The moratorium remains up to the time of writing,
March, 2005.
15 The new Forest Ordinance states “right holder means a person who does not have proprietary rights over
forest but has rights or privileges over reserved forests, protected forests, wasteland as per record of rights
admitted at the time of settlement or subsequently admitted as right holder by Government” (Government of
NWFP, 2002, p. 1152).
17 Forest land was registered under the Survey of Forests. Other land was registered under the Settlement
Record. Both were completed in the mid 1980s in Ajmir (cf. Southwold-Llewellyn, n.d., for details).
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Furthermore, it ignores the customary usufruct rights embedded in the moral right to
subsistence based on Islamic principles and customary practice (cf. Southwold-Llewellyn,
2002; Scott, 1976; Sundar and Jeffery, 1999).
By law, the state has total control over the management of the forests: no one can cut
down a tree without permission. Legally sanctioned extraction is controlled by the Forest
Department through Working Plans administered by the Forest Development Corporation
through private contractors. The role of the Forest Department is largely regulatory, though
not effective in terms of consistent implementation by lower-level officials or in terms of
practices of local residents.
Ajmir is included in the Working Plan for Alpuri, 1984–1994,18 which was designed “To
meet the essential requirements of the local people for timber, firewood and grazing”
(Government of NWFP, 1984, p. 63), thus implicitly acknowledging the rights of all local
people. What is not acknowledged or stipulated is the heterogeneity of local rightholders
and their practices in forest management with regard to whom they allow access to ‘their’
bandas, and particularly the forests that are part of their banda.
It is through rights to the banda that both usufruct and royalty rights to the forests are
claimed. The banda is an area, usually the side of a mountain partitioned from another
banda by natural features, where nuclear families settle during the summer as a respite from
the cramped extended-household dwellings in the permanent settlement. In addition, as part
of the montane production strategy, the banda provides grazing for buffaloes, cows, sheep
and goats. Migrants to the banda may clear part of the land to cultivate a few crops
(primarily fast growing maize and potatoes) if the altitude will permit.
Akhund Khel banda shares, whether inherited19 or bought, have been subdivided over
successive generations. Hence rights to banda resources are expressed in fractions of a share.
One banda is divided into two shares; the others are divided into between 5 and 40 shares.
All shareholders have equal use-rights to grazing and forests, regardless of their share size.
For example, someone with 1/5 share of half the banda has as many rights as someone with
1/40th share to the other half. Any decisions about change in management must be made, at
least in theory, with other right holders. The profits from logging and rents for grazing are
distributed in proportion to size of share. And the risk of overexploitation of the forest by
those needing and selling fuelwood must also be shared. This contrasts with the state’s view
that shares are individually owned.
During the last two to three generations, many Akhund Khel sold their shares in the bandas.
Today, only 40% of Akhund Khel households ‘own’ a share in a banda. Whole bandas were
sold for a buffalo, or to repay a debt because the bandas were not a source of cash income.20
Many of these bandas were bought by the other khels in the vicinity who previously had no
bandas. Others were sold to Gujars, a transhumant group from Bunir District.
18 This remained applicable until the Forest Ordinance become law at the end of 2004. The Forest Ordinance
gives the same rights of use as those stipulated in the Working Plan (Government of NWFP, 2002).
19 In principle, sons inherit equally when their father dies. However, sometimes, the land is divided equally
among the sons and their father before his death. Also, if the family has little land, larger shares may be given
to elder brothers. And in the past, when a man had more than one wife, the inheritance of sons born to
different mothers was not equal.
20 Another factor may have been that, after incorporation, owners did not feel that their ownership was secure;
but none of my informants mentioned this.
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Actors at the Local Level
Land registration encoded the legal rights of royalty right holders, and by implication the
management rights of right holders against non-right holders. In this context we can
identify different social actors with different sets of interests: government officials, right
holders, non-right holders, and women.
Government Officials
The Divisional Forest Officer21 told me that everyone is allowed to cut fuel wood from the
Ajmir area, regardless of whether or not they are right holders. He said his role was to
protect the forest, but “We must solve local people’s needs before the forest can be
preserved.” He told me that if a permit for building timber is granted, a jirga of right
holders must give permission for the tree to be cut.
The implementation of policy is through local Forest Guards. The Range Officer (senior
to the Forest Guard) told me that the rules concerning fuelwood are the same throughout
Malakand Division. In many parts of Malakand Division, fuelwood collection is heavily
fined, although in the Ajmir area, the Forest Guards say they are tolerant because there is no
other source of heating.22 There did seem to be consensus, in practice, that it was up to the
royalty right holders to decide who could take fuelwood. This contrasts with the intention
of the Working Plan and the Divisional Forest Officer’s interpretation of the Working Plan
that all local residents should have fuelwood.
Local residents view Forest Guards as corrupt. I was told repeatedly that a person caught
with timber is fined unless they bribe the Forest Guards. On the other hand, there have been
incidents elsewhere where Forest Guards have been beaten up or even killed by right
holders selling wood illegally.
The interpretation and implementation of the law varies among different Forest
Guards.23 The perceptions of local residents about how the Forest Guards operate also
differ from how the Guards see themselves and how higher levels of officials perceive
them. “Thus the understanding and motivations of government officials at these local levels
crucially mediate how the policies formulated a higher levels are actually presented to their
intended beneficiaries” (Springer, 2000, p. 87). In this case, the intermediary role of the
Forest Guards in representing and implementing the policies of the state is inconsistent and
impotent.24
Royalty Right holders
De facto rights of right holders to decide who can take timber and fuelwood from ‘their’
banda are supported by customary practice and the impotence and inconsistency of Forest
Guards. Their rights in relation to other right holders and to non-right holders are also
ambiguous, and embedded in conflicting principles of sociopolitical organization and moral
21 Interviews on 28 June, 1993 and 2 August, 1994, with Salar Khan, Divisional Forest Officer for Alpuri
whose area included Ajmir.
22 Cf. Southwold-Llewellyn, 2005, for detailed ethnography on the interpretations and practice of four guards
working in Ajmir.
23 See Steimann, 2003 for an example in Hazara.
24 See Gururani, 2000: 185–88 for a comparative and mostly similar account of the position of Forest Guards
in India.
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rights and duties. Any right holder in Ajmir can grant permission to a non-right holder to
cut timber, collect fuelwood, or graze animals. The size of the share is important for
distributing the rents collected for grazing and particularly the revenues for timber
harvested by the state. In recent years, some of the larger banda right holders have received
sums up to Rupees 900,000 (approximately US $33,457)25 in royalties. Such windfalls
have enabled investment in land, housing, migration to the Middle East, and local
enterprises (e.g., shop or water mill). Hence, some of the larger right holders want to protect
the forests; but given the structure of share-holdership, management practice, and social
organization, it is difficult for them to cooperate as a group in changing the management of
the bandas. Rather, their cooperation, or lack of cooperation, is dependent on wider social
and political interests.
One of the most difficult aspects of describing resource management is that there is little
consistency in management principles. As with the Forest Guards, there is variation among
informants who hold similar positions in the community. Unlike the Forest Guards, most of
whom I interviewed only once, the accounts of individual right holders varied with each of
numerous conversations over a two year period. The conflicting constructions of one large
right holder about who may collect fuel wood in his bandas are typical:
1) Everyone should have access to fuelwood. There are no restrictions. No one needs to
ask. How can anyone live here without fuelwood?
2) Anyone who is a member of the community may collect fuelwood. [Who is a member
of the community is a fluid concept.]
3) Anyone who has paid rent for grazing their animals in the banda can collect fuelwood.
4) Only those who are given permission by a shareowner can collect fuelwood.
a) A shareowner will give permission to anyone who asks.
b) A shareowner will give permission to anyone who gives him political support.
c) A shareowner will let anyone collect fuelwood, except his enemies
5) Only shareholders may collect fuelwood.
It is the fluidity of these “principles” that characterize the management of bandas. On
the one hand, they use the discourse of the government that forests need to be protected to
extricate themselves from obligations to those who do not have a share in the banda. On the
other hand, if private right holders limit access, they will reduce opportunities to enhance
prestige and to mobilize political followers in jirga meetings. Without clients you cannot
develop economic resources such as labor for cultivation or for building new enterprises,
such as a water mill. Therefore, these conflicting constructions are a form of risk
management, giving maximum alternative options in the present and for the future.
Non-Right Holders
The use rights of non-right holders are also recognized: other Akhund Khel, other khels living
in this part of Ajmir, tenants, and those who rent grazing rights in the banda. There are,
however, differences in the nature of their rights. In practice those from Akhund Khel and the
other khels who have no banda share, or do not have sufficient fuelwood in their own bandas,
take fuelwood. Those who are tenants of the cultivated land of banda right holders usually
may take fuelwood from the landlord’s banda, as may those who stay in the banda and pay
rent for their animals. Access is based mostly on relations with a particular right holder.
25 The rate of exchange in June, 1993, was Rs. 26.913 to $1.
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On any day, there is a continuous procession of people carrying heavy loads of fuelwood
and timber down the mountain from the bandas. Most are men; many have returned for the
summer to collect fuelwood for their household consumption during the winter. Much of it
is for sale to supplement subsistence. From the perspective of the right holders, subsistence
is based on household need for fuelwood. From the perspective of the poorest, the sale of
forest products is an important part of their subsistence.
Women
Women are the largest group dependent on fuelwood for household tasks. Most women
denied collecting fuelwood because it is shameful. From observation, however, many of the
Akhund Khel women, particularly those considered too old to maintain purdah, carry
bundles of cut fuelwood, as did women from other khels.
Although I heard many complaints from women that some banda right holders did not
allow them rights to collect fuelwood, I know of no disputes that directly involved women.
Women’s complaints are addressed in the jirga by men. It is behind the public arena that
they exert their influence. Men discuss strategies for their role in a future jirga meeting with
respected women. And if there is a serious dispute within the khel, women will discuss
among themselves how the dispute can be resolved and how they can get their husbands to
act according to their plan.
Management in Practice
In this Provincially Administered Tribal Area, the first tier of the legal system is
community-based jirgas. How they operate is central for understanding how forests are
managed, and how disputes over rights to forest use are resolved.
Right Holders of the Same Banda
In theory, right holders of the same banda have jirga meetings to decide who can use their
banda for grazing and what rents will be charged for grazing, who can collect fuelwood,
and what trees will be cut. Because the Akhund Khel banda shares are usually inherited,
they are generally close relatives: brothers and father’s brothers’ sons. Rarely is there
agreement among them.
On one level of analysis, this disunity is surprising since they share a common economic
interest in their bandas. There is a Pukhtun adage which exemplifies segmentary opposition
in acephalous patrilineages: I against my brother, my brother and I against our father’s
brother’s sons, my brother and I and our father’s brother’s sons against our father’s father’s
brothers’ sons etc. This adage illustrates how the principles of lineage solidarity and
economic interest, are cross-cut by the principle of autonomy. All three principles are key to
understand how coalitions are formed and broken within jirgas.
The introduction of state controlled commercial felling clearly marks the right holders as
a financial interest group. However, their inability to act as a group is embedded in their
history of actions and ideas about the self in relation to others, i.e., their identity (cf.
Southwold-Llewellyn, 2005). Barth (1969) explains that the distinctiveness of Pukhtun
culture is based on value orientations which “... emphasize male autonomy and egality, self-
expression and aggressiveness in a syndrome which might be summarized under the
concept of honour (izzat)” (p. 120).
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In terms of economic self-interest, the right holders have a common interest in control-
ling the amount of fuelwood and timber leaving the forests. As a group, most of them
acknowledge the needs of everyone to have fuelwood; but it is not in their interest for non-
right holders to sell what is not for their domestic need. Furthermore, many right holders are
selling timber without the agreement of their joint right holders. Yet, in practice little can be
done to stop the illegal, informal economy because of disunity among right holders. This
lack of cohesion is an integral part of Pukhtun identity that underscores their sociopolitical
organization based on patron–client relationships as well as kinship. This contrasts with the
idea that common interest will promote trust and collective action (Poteete and Ostrom,
2004).
Patron–Client Relationships
In principle, every man living in Ajmir should be present at jirga meetings. Respect is given
to those who have conciliatory skills, irrespective of age or khel. Those who are not
Akhund Khel are particularly important in their role as mediators for resolving disputes
concerning Akhund Khel. However, gaining a consensus of support depends on a loyal
following. It is through their support in jirga meetings of their patrons that non-right
holders gain access to fuelwood and timber.
Individual autonomy and self-interest are exemplified by the concepts of dushman (an
enemy or foe) and of dost (a friend). One informant told me: “The changing value of
bandas is a major source of dushmani in the village. It is only natural because some are
getting richer and others getting poorer.”26Dushmani reinforces patron–client relationships
and is a key factor in the inability of right holders to agree on a common policy in
managing their joint bandas. A non-right holder told me that he can take wood from a
friend’s banda while others who are not friends (dushmani) cannot. In answer to questions
about special things he would do to represent friendship he said: “If anybody attacks my
friend, then I will support him. I would support him even if I thought he was wrong because
he is a friend.” What if you are a dost of one shareholder and a dushman of another? “If
there are five owners, and one is a friend, it is all right because the one rightholder will say
that I took his share.”
Therefore, one means of access to fuelwood, as well as sanctions, is linked to patron–
client relationships, which by their very nature are divisive. A sanction against stealing can
be the threat of violence; yet, the offender will have a protective patron. Likewise, right
holders are only likely to report persons to the Forest Guards who are someone else’s client.
In both cases, there is a risk of conflict among the right holders, thus having the effect of
protecting use by clients.
Relations with cultivating tenants are more complex. Akhund Khel landlords cannot
have tenants of their own khel. “No matter how poor, a Mia will not work for others.” Since
the economy is only partially based on agriculture, tenants, like everyone else, are more
dependent on migration, especially since they get only a 1/4 share of the crop, plus inputs
and fodder.27 Hence, there is a scarcity of labor, especially since most women of Akhund
Khel are excluded from agricultural production activities due to their socio-religious status
as Miangans. One landlord told me that he must give fuelwood and grazing to his tenants,
otherwise, “how will my fields be cultivated?” Nevertheless, cultivating tenants are in an
26 Banerjee, 2000, notes that during the Colonial Period, Pathan violence increased as an egalitarian social
order was replaced by feudal hierarchy.
27 A ¼ share is unique to Kana and Alpuri. In Swat, tenants receive ½ share of the crop.
Hum Ecol (2006) 34:637–653 649
insecure position. Few have a tenancy for more than a few years, even though most of them
have lived in Ajmir for generations. This general practice reduces the power of tenants and
it is symptomatic of the fluidity of patron–client relations.
Underlying all these relations is the threat of violence. The Forest Guards are afraid of
violence; and it is not surprising that the new Forest Ordinance authorizes them to carry
arms. However, the threat of violence curtails the extent of its use and affects the
management of bandas. Some right holders are constrained by their fear of what non-right
holders would do if they did not have fuelwood:
If we do not allow our landless relatives to collect wood, there would be a collision
between them and us. When it snows, everyone needs a lot of wood. If they have no
wood, those without would fight with us. A poor man will be in opposition to me if I
do not give him wood. How can we live here if everyone is in opposition?
On the other hand, tenants from other khels repeatedly told me that they were afraid of
Akhund Khel. The threat of violence also works as a counter-balancing force. It may be
used to terrorize weak individuals, such as tenants of another khel, or to forge temporary
alliances. But it has little potential to protect the self-interest of right holders, as a group,
against non-right holders.
Political Alliances with National Political Parties
The jirga is also a microcosm of national political party factions. Akhund Khel is divided
into four, sometimes five, subdivisions based on descent. These sub-khels are mixed in
terms of landholdings and domicile; and all are closely related through intermarriage. Each
sub-khel has its own leaders and supports different national political parties in alliance with
another sub-khel.
Whichever political party is in power enables supporters to use force. For example, in
the spirit of community-based development, several drinking water schemes have been
introduced by a succession of political parties. The government supplied the materials and
the local community organized the labor. When the Pakistan People’s Party was in power,
the Muslim League supporters in the hamlet were not given pipes. The reverse happened
when the Muslim League gained power. This affected the poor as well as the wealthier.
Naturally, it led to physical conflict with the use of Kalashnikovs and rifles to steal pipes
from the opposing faction.
These sub-khel alliances are not stable because no one wants anyone else to be a leader.
These sentiments underlie the lack of cooperation and help to exlpain the limited resources
provided to the area.
Conclusions
During the colonial period, the Forest Department created legislation to protect the forests
(from the local population) in order to log the timber (for state revenue). Similar policies
were adopted by the ruler of Swat. The policies of the colonial Forest Departments in India
and Pakistan never did work as intended because they disregarded the logic of indigenous
institutions.28 In practice, local-level management of forests has always been devolved in
28 Irrigation in Tamil Nadu is another example. See Mosse, 2003.
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Ajmir. However, the community-based forest management which operates in Ajmir does not
fit the ideals of community-based management envisaged by donor-driven policymakers.
Devolution assumes that participatory forest management will be based on homogeneous
interest groups, stereotyped as economic interest groups. As a consequence of government
forest policies, economic group interests have been reinforced by: 1) forest land registration
which has dichotomized users into royalty right holders and non-royalty right holders; and
2) by both state controlled and illegal commercial felling which has increased incomes for
royalty right holders. However, the institutions that manage the forests are structured by
parallel hierarchies based on cross-cutting linkages of kinship and/or patronage. These
alliances are fluid due to cultural values which emphasize autonomy and competition. This
management structure is reinforced by the jirga where factions represent a cross-section of
the dominant patrilineages that include both right holders and non-right holders. The voice
of the weakest is not heard through their coalition as an economic interest group, but
through their support of a patron. And although women are not present in jirga meetings,
they do have influence.
In spite of the difficulties illustrated by the case of Ajmir, placing responsibilities on
local inhabitants does provide opportunities for sustainable forest management. It is
obvious that forest use cannot be controlled effectively by state edict or local-level officials.
And furthermore, the government does not have the resources to provide either the human
or material infrastructural support to realistically create new institutions everywhere. It
would be a better use of limited resources to support the existing institutional framework of
jirgas, flawed though it is.
In the present context, equitable use rights are most likely to be protected in the short-
term by supporting existing management institutions that protect the use rights of all.
Strong principles of the moral rights of everyone are based on Islamic ideals, and reinforced
by patron–client relationships.29
This case illustrates that the Forest Department is not in a position to control forest use.
Under the management of local jirgas the extent of forest exploitation is less than in many
other areas where the Forest Department has greater control. This is not to say that jirgas
maintain sustainable forest management. Rather, they address the contradictions between
conservation and livelihood needs. More fundamentally, the examples of both jirga and
community-based management should raise the question whether the assumption that
devolution will lead to better livelihoods and sustainable resource use is correct.
The devolution of local government was introduced in 2001. Although power has yet to
be devolved effectively from the Provincial Government, elections have taken place. A
proactive structural change is that one-third of the seats are to be held by women. Awoman
from Ajmir has been elected to the Union Council. She has outstanding personal qualities,
acknowledged by her election, but she is not able to attend the Union Council meetings
because no provision has been made to keep the women in purdah during the meetings. Her
husband, one of the poorer members of Akhund Khel, attends the meetings on her behalf.
Nonetheless, this is a promising first step.30
Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue that there is a need for strong central government
control to change patterns of elite hierarchies at the lower level. As I have pointed out, strong
central government control is unrealistic in this context. More encouraging, they further argue
that the interests of commoners can be protected in situations where elites have diversified
opinions. Jirgas are such an arena. In the case presented, jirgas are strongest where
29 A fuller explanation is in Southwold-Llewellyn, 2002.
30 Cf. Gupte, 2004, for an example of how women are marginalized in CBM in India.
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community-based management has been criticized. They prevent local elites from
domination and they protect equitable distribution of subsistence needs from the forests.
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